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Abstract
This paper aims to examine the effect of the fraud hexagon on fraudulent financial statements (FFS),
and the audit committee (AC)'s role in moderating this relation. The research model uses logit
regression with data on all non-financial companies in Indonesia ranging from 2016 to 2020, which
were obtained from annual reports and Thomson Reuters. The sensitivity test uses a coefficient
difference test based on the Overall Manipulation Index. This study shows that the probability of FFS
is higher when the manager has the stimulus, opportunity, and capability. On the other hand,
rationalization and collusion do not affect the probability of FFS. Interestingly, managers with high
ego do not commit fraudulent financial reporting. The AC can minimize the stimulus, opportunity, and
capability of the manager to make FFS. On the other hand, the AC cannot minimize the rationalization,
ego, and collusion network of the manager. Theoretically, this study contributes to developing the
situational action theory literature related to FFS and the fraud hexagon framework. This study
provides academic implications that the arguments and empirical research findings that examine the
behavior of managers in committing fraudulent financial reporting can be built not only based on the
proxies used, but also by referring to the fraud theoretical framework.
Keywords: Audit Committee, Fraud Hexagon, Fraudulent Financial Statement

Abstrak
Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menguji pengaruh fraud hexagon terhadap terjadinya kecurangan laporan
keuangan, serta peran komite audit memoderasi pengaruh ini. Model penelitian ini menggunakan
regresi logit dengan data seluruh perusahaan non keuangan di Indonesia dari tahun 2016 hingga 2020
yang diperoleh dari annual report dan Thomson Reuters. Uji sensitivitas menggunakan uji beda
koefisien berdasarkan tingkat Overall Manipulation Index. Studi ini menunjukkan bahwa probabilitas
FFS lebih tinggi ketika manajer memiliki stimulus, peluang, dan kapabilitas. Di sisi lain, manajemen
tidak mempertimbangkan ego, rasionalisasi dan jaringan kolusi dalam melakukan FFS. AC dapat
meminimalisir stimulus, peluang, dan kapabilitas manajer untuk melakukan FFS. Di sisi lain, AC tidak
dapat meminimalisir jaringan rasionalisasi, ego, dan kolusi manajemen. Secara teoritis, penelitian ini
memberikan kontribusi untuk mengembangkan literatur situational action theory dan framework fraud
hexagon. Studi ini memberikan implikasi akademis bahwa argumen dan temuan penelitian empiris yang
mengkaji perilaku manajer untuk melakukan FFS dapat dibangun tidak hanya berdasarkan proksi yang
digunakan, melainkan mengacu pada framework teori fraud.
Kata kunci: Audit Committee, Fraud Hexagon, Fraudulent Financial Statement
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INTRODUCTION
Fraud costs organizations, corporations, and governments billions in
monetary terms and poses massive adverse
effects on fraud victims. Therefore,
understanding the causes of frauds are of
paramount importance because it will allow
steps to open the occurrence of fraud
(Maulidi and Ansell 2020). Fraud is
difficult to eliminate when the society is
less likely to perceive certain types of
behavior as wrong and unwilling to deal
with it in a meaningful way (Eriksson et al.
2015; Liu et al. 2017). In a survey
conducted by the Association of Certified
Fraud Examiners (ACFE) (ACFE, 2021),
among the types of fraud that causes
tremendous loss to organizations is
fraudulent financial statements (FFS).
Thus far, models that describe the
causes of fraud use fraud theories, such as
the fraud triangle, fraud diamond, and
others. However, those models are not
without criticism (Free 2015; Murphy
2012), the implication of the fraud triangle
is restricted to explaining partial fraud
perpetrated by a single offender. Rabeea et
al. (Rabeea et al. 2018) criticizes that the
theoretical framework in the fraud triangle
is only focused on a single psychological
dimension of a fraud perpetrator acting
alone. Furthermore, Maulidi and Ansell
(Maulidi and Ansell 2020) also have shown
that other elements matter rather than the
simplified psychology by Cressey (Cressey
1953), leading to the fraud triangle. The
environment strongly influences individual
factors; one must focus on intrinsic factors
inherent in individuals and trigger fraud
intentions (Utami et al. 2019). The
development of literature that criticizes
previous fraud models has led to the advent
of a fraud model that is more up-to-date,
which is the fraud hexagon model.
Vousinas (Vousinas 2019) developed this
model based on the central assumption that
fraud occurs due to the cooperation or
collusion between the leaders in a
company. This model assumes that a lousy
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leadership environment, or a “poor tone at
the top”, renders it easier for a fraud to
occur in various lines within a company
because the fraud does not need to be
carried out secretly.
Findings related to the previous fraud
models are still debatable. Sari et al. (2020),
Yulianti et al. (2019), and Nindito (2018)
regarding the fraud pentagon model
similarly found that the ego measurement is
not appropriate to represent the arrogance
of the managers. This suggests that the
fraud pentagon model needs to be refined
using other models. Thus, this study seeks
to improve the fraud hexagon model, which
uses ego measurements following the
precedent set by Garcia-Meca et al. (2021).
The fraud hexagon model also shifts
the paradigm from pressure to stimulus,
where the stimulus is described as an
impulse that does not only come from
corporate pressure. This contrasts with the
studies conducted by Meiryani et al. (2020),
Sari et al. (2020), Yulianti et al. (2019), and
Fitri et al. (2019), which view that pressure
only comes from the company's financial
factors. Previous researchers have not
widely discussed the shift in the meaning of
pressure to stimulus, leaving a room that
can be developed from past studies. In
addition, Vousinas' model has not yet
determined how to reflect the collusion
committed by the company. This cause has
resulted in the development of research
related to the fraud hexagon that has not
mushroomed, which is trying to be
answered by this study.
A fraud can be detected through the
information contained in a financial
statement. The FFS detection model that is
often used to examine whether a financial
statement contains an element of
manipulation is the Beneish’s M-Score
Model, but many researchers adjusted the
model's construct to the conditions in their
respective countries. Svabova et al. (2020)
adapted the construct of the model to the
conditions in Slovakia, where such a
modified model was able to detect frauds
more accurately than the original M-score
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from Beneish. Lu and Zhao (2020) adjusted
the M-score based on the economic
conditions in the People’s Republic of
China, and Shaari et al. (2017) in Iran.
Meanwhile, in Indonesia, no research has
adjusted the construct of the M-score
model, which frequently resulted in
inaccuracies in detecting frauds compared
to the other detection models, as found by
Aviantara (2021), Kukreja et al. (2020), and
Maccarthy (2017).
On the other hand, companies must
have optimal corporate governance (CG)
mechanisms to support company supervision. One of the general indications about
CG that good governance leads to highquality financial reports (Hasnan et al.
2021). Al-Absy et al. (2019) criticize a
more critical issue, which is how
adequately the audit committee (AC) can
play a role in monitoring the accounting
and financial reporting processes. AC is
usually charged with ensuring that the
company's financial statement meets the
criteria for accuracy (Gorshunov et al.
2021). Therefore, it must be meticulous and
set the tone to ensure accuracy in the firm's
financial reporting (Compernolle 2018;
Fiolleau et al. 2019; Turley and Zaman
2007). Thus, fraud reporting is likely to
occur when the AC relaxes its thoroughness
and follows the manager's recommendations without verifying critical statements (Gorshunov et al. 2021).
This research has several novelty
contributions that can develop further
academic literature. This study focuses on
discussing the fraudulent behavior of managers in manipulating financial statements,
where we identified that managers tend to
commit frauds when they have great
opportunities and the ability and good
understanding to take advantage of such
opportunities. Previous empirical studies
that use the context of Indonesian
background (Fitri et al. 2019; Handoko and
Tandean 2021; Sari et al. 2020; Yulianti et
al. 2019) tend to discuss the indications of
fraud in the financial statements, instead of
the underlying behavior. Huber (Huber

2017) also argues that the fraud triangle
framework has been misused by
researchers and has little to do with
explaining fraud or "shedding light on
fraud." It can be seen which behavioral
elements motivate managers to commit
fraud. On the other hand, previous studies
that discuss fraud behavior were mostly in
the form of conceptual research, such as
Lokanan and Sharma (2018), Koomson et
al. (2020), and Avortri and Agbanyo
(2021). Therefore, this research opens a
new avenue to the approach of combining
empirical research findings whose main
argument comes from fraudulent behavior
in the fraud hexagon model.
The FFS detection models in the
previous studies in countries other than
Indonesia were modified in accordance
with their current respective economic
conditions. In contrast, studies based in
Indonesia, such as Aviantara et al. (2021),
only used the basic M-score equation. Thus,
this study seeks to strengthen the M-score
prediction findings using the Overall
Manipulation Index (OMI) as a part of the
sensitivity test, which is still scarcely
investigated by previous studies. According
to Hasan et al. (2017), OMI can detect FFS
more accurately because it can see the
potential for FFS in each component of the
financial statements.
Furthermore, the fraud theory has
developed into the latest model, namely the
fraud hexagon (Vousinas 2019), which still
does not have many empirical findings to
support its development. The fraud
hexagon model is a model that identifies six
factors for the occurrence of fraud; in which
this model is the first fraud model that
carries the assumption that fraud is carried
out in groups or collusion. So far, the
element of collusion has not been
considered as a factor in the occurrence of
fraud by previous fraud models. This new
element still lacks evidence from previous
studies because the model developed by
Vousinas (2019) is still in the form of
conceptual research that has not determined
how to measure collusion by the managers.
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This study seeks to prove how the elements
of collusion can be known, which is still a
little research linking collusion that occurs
in FFS.
In addition, this study relates the
findings to the Situational Action Theory
(SAT), a theory that is still rarely addressed
and associated with FFS. This study implies
that the fraud that occurs is based on the
situations faced by the person as well as
how they react and make decisions. This
study found that managers who have a
stimulus to commit fraud know that there
are opportunities and have the ability to
execute FFS. Other findings also imply that
the behavior of managers who take actions
based on the situation they face can at least
be minimized by the optimal role of the AC
in maintaining the quality of financial
reports, in which the AC can moderate the
stimulus, opportunities, and capabilities of
managers. In other words, CG must be
addressed and strengthened to limit
managers' fraudulent behavior. From the
implication of this study, it is hoped that
investors can be more careful in investing
their funds in companies. This implication
also serves as a warning for the issuers that
CG is essential, and that maintaining the
quality of financial reports cannot only
depend on the AC. This study provides
academic implications that the arguments
and empirical research findings that
examine the behavior of managers to
conduct FFS can be built not only based on
the proxies used. So far, the majority of
empirical studies that discuss the fraud
model address the proxies of the elements
in the fraud model. Those conclusions
obtained are less clear to see which of the
managers’ behaviors that have the potential
to commit fraudulent financial reporting.
The following sections in this study
are organized as follows: Section 2
provides the reviews of empirical
assessments and hypotheses. Section 3
presents the data and the adopted
methodologies. Section 4 describes the
empirical results, and Section 5 concludes.
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LITERATURE REVIEW AND
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Literature Review
Situational Action Theory
One theory that summarizes the
structural theory of financial crime is the
Situational Action Theory (SAT) (Lokanan
and Aujla 2020). The basis of the SAT
model proposes that criminal acts result
from a perception-choice process as a
situational mechanism initiated and guided
by the interaction of individual tendencies
and the environment that can lead to crime
(Wikström 2010). Even under similar
conditions, someone can perform different
actions at different times. It means that
many factors can influence a person to
commit a crime. Even though there is an
opportunity to start, a person may not
commit fraud because of supervision or the
lack of support from their partner.
Lokanan (2018) categorizes financial
crime as a moral problem, which can be
analyzed using the SAT approach. SAT
seeks to understand why disobedience
between moral rules and individual moral
values occurs and leads to rule violations
(Lokanan and Aujla 2020). The fraud
hexagon identifies the causes of someone
committing a fraud by dividing it into
several moral and environmental factors,
one of which is collusion. Because FFS is
a part of financial crime, its occurrence as a
result of moral and environmental problems
is terrible. The moral factor of a person
described in the hexagon fraud is the
primary cause of someone committing
fraudulent financial reporting. The
occurrence of fraudulent financial reporting
is also coherent with the SAT's view that
making "more or fewer choices can be"
depending on the level of familiarity based
on the setting one is following as well as the
circumstances (Wikström 2014).
Background Context in Indonesia
The Association of Certified Fraud
Examiners’ (ACFE) survey (2021) found
that the Asia-Pacific region has the most
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noticeable loss impact worldwide due to
frauds. Indonesia is the country that has the
most fraud cases in the Asia-Pacific region
with 36 cases, surpassing China in second
place with 33 fraud cases. The survey is
based on a questionnaire targeting Certified
Fraud Examiners who received fraud cases
between 2018 – 2019, and have identified
the fraud perpetrators. The questionnaire in
the survey contains question indicators
regarding the details of the fraud cases,
including information on perpetrators,
victim organizations, fraud methods used,
as well as general fraud trends.
This finding is supported by the 2020
Corruption Perception Index’s survey,
which shows that Indonesia has experienced a decline in scores compared to 2019
among countries in the ASEAN region.
This indicates that during the 2019-2020
period, fraud cases in Indonesia have
increased more than in other countries.
Many cases of FFS experienced by large
companies, such as Garuda Indonesia, were
specifically investigated by Aviantara
(2021). This has put CG in Indonesia under
the spotlight due to the rise of FFS cases.
Regulations in Indonesia stipulate
that the model structure used by companies
operating in Indonesia is based on a twoboard system. In Indonesia, ownership
characteristics dominated by concentrated
ownership are the main obstacles to
governance practices (Utama et al. 2017a),
which means there are potential agency
problems between majority shareholders
and minority shareholders. Good governance can reduce agency costs because
management prioritizes the interests of
shareholders by maximizing company
resources (Mardjono and Chen 2020).
Companies must carry out CG under the
principles of transparency, accountability,
responsibility, independence, and fairness.
CG in Indonesia aims to protect investors
from information gaps that can be exploited
by the top management in a company.
"Tone at the top" has a significant role in
describing whether the company's management is implementing good CG. Suppose

management does not carry out governance
according to the rules. In that case, the
company can be considered unhealthy
because there are many fraud scandals,
which can lead to the company’s bankruptcy. These companies collapsed due to
strategic failures and fraudulent practices
from the top management that went
undetected for a long time because of the
lack of independent supervision by the
board of commissioners.
The AC is critical in assisting the
supervisory function, especially concerning
the supervision of information contained in
the financial reports issued by management
(Ariningrum and Diyanty 2017). The AC
consists of at least one independent
commissioner and two other members from
outside the company. The AC's duties are
stipulated under POJK (Financial Services
Authority Regulation) Number 55 of 2015,
reflecting on the ASEAN Corporate
Governance Scorecard (ACGS). Through
the supervisory mechanism regulated by
the AC, managers cannot commit frauds in
preparing financial reports (Mardjono and
Chen 2020). The number of invalid
financial reports is also the responsibility of
the AC (Pathak et al., 2021), which also
indirectly contributes to the occurrence of
fraud. Therefore, AC has a strategic
position to minimize the possibility of
managers committing frauds and making
FFS.
Hypotheses Development
With the authority that managers
have in preparing financial statements, they
have the potential of using financial reports
as a tool to commit frauds. Whether a
manager can commit fraud can only be seen
through his personality and behavior, which
can then describe how they faces issues and
obstacles in preparing their financial
statements. Manager behavior that can
potentially cause them to commit
fraudulent financial reporting is illustrated
in the fraud hexagon model, which consists
of stimulus, opportunity, rationalization,
capability, ego, and collusion network.
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According to Deutsch (Deutsch
1966), the meaning of stimulus is that a
person's response to take an action is the
result of stimulation at the time of the
previous experience. The combination of
stimulus and response will create a
particular behavior in which the stimulus
arises from within the person. In the context
of frauds, someone who is stimulated to
commit a fraud will responsively commit
fraud incidentally. The response to deviant
actions results from an urge or stimulus,
which then requires a person to commit
fraud (Yazid et al. 2020). One of the events
that occur incidentally in the company is
the presence of left and unused cash.
Unused company cash will motivate
managers to commit fraud (Fakhroni et al.
2018). In other words, one of the factors
that can stimulate managers to manipulate
financial statements is the presence of
excess cash in the company, which
increases their motivation to obtain more
incentives.
On the other hand, managers with
weak self-control will impulsively perform
FFS (Khatwani and Goyal 2019), causing
control over managers to be an essential
means to reduce agency conflict between
shareholders and managers (Mouline and
Sadok 2021). Managers with positions that
are prone to fraud, such as having a specific
authority in making decisions and preparing financial statements, will have more
potential to commit fraudulent financial
reporting. Such vulnerable positions
potentially increase the stimulus for the
manager to make FFS, and therefore, there
is a need for strict supervision in the
preparation of financial statements, which
is the prominent role of the AC. Strict
supervision from the AC causes managers
to always have good intentions and avoid
situations that cause them to be motivated
into committing fraudulent financial
reporting. With the AC, the stimulus will
not encourage the manager to respond by
making FFS because the AC helps control
the manager from deviant behaviors.
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H1a: Managers are likely to be involved
in FFS when they have a high
stimulus to commit fraud.
H1b: The AC moderates the relationship
between the manager's stimulus to
the probability of FFS.
Opportunity has a different meaning
from stimulus. Stimulus is when a person is
in a condition that encourages them to
commit a fraud with a motivation that
comes from within themselves. At the same
time, opportunities can occur when an
individual gains access to something wrong
(Saluja et al. 2021). This access comes from
the external factors of the people who want
to commit frauds. The external factor is the
strength of an entity's internal control
system as a measure of the extent to which
opportunities will be created within the
organization to provide space for individuals to engage in fraud (Koomson et al.
2020). Opportunities arise from the
weaknesses of the company's supervision,
which is described as a situation that allows
fraud to occur (Khatwani and Goyal 2019).
This allows the perpetrators to be
undetected after committing fraud (Desai
2020). Managers have the opportunity to
commit fraudulent financial reporting
because the preparation of financial statements requires estimates and subjective
considerations (Skousen et al. 2009).
Managers will focus on looking for
opportunities in transactions in the
company if they intend to manipulate the
financial statements (Schnatterly et al.
2018). Managers benefit from their position
of being able to compile financial reports
and have the advantage of information
asymmetry so they can get the opportunity
to make FFS at any time. On the other hand,
the AC has the authority and resources to
protect the stakeholders' interests by
ensuring the reliability of financial
reporting, internal control, and risk
management, as well as through careful
monitoring (Abdillah et al. 2019).
Companies with weak internal controls will
have loopholes that present the managers
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with
opportunities
to
manipulate
transactions (Yazid et al. 2020). The AC
must maintain the quality of the
information submitted in the financial
statements, so that managers do not take
advantage of opportunities to manipulate
them.
H2a: Managers are likely to be involved
in FFS when they have a high
opportunity to commit fraud.
H2b: The AC moderates the relationship
between the manager's opportunity
to the probability of FFS.
Rationalization is an individual's
attitude that makes them justify their
fraudulent behaviors as not a crime
(Abdullahi and Mansor 2015). Fraud
perpetrators often do not think of
themselves as criminals—they rationalize it
by understanding their illegal behavior and
maintaining the belief that they are still
trusted before committing a fraud (Owusu
et al. 2021). Managers never think of
themselves as fraudsters because they feel
they are doing their job well. They think
that what is reported in the financial
statements is true until fraud is detected
because, from their view, it is the manager
who runs the company, so they are the one
who knows the ins and outs of the
transactions. On the other hand, AC has a
vital role in maintaining the company's
quality of financial statements. AC can
counter what the manager thinks is correct
by examining the financial statements they
have prepared. Managers will insist that
what they are doing is not fraud until the
supervisory board conducts checks and
investigations to prove the validity of the
information that they provided (Abdillah et
al. 2019).
H3a: Managers are likely to be involved
in FFS when they have a high
rationalization to commit fraud.
H3b: The AC moderates the relationship
between the manager's rationalization to the probability of FFS.

Capabilities refer to personal traits
and abilities that play a major role in
whether fraud will occur in the presence of
pressure, opportunity, and rationalization
(Vousinas 2019). The ACFE survey (2021)
also shows that most of the frauds are
carried out by the management and toplevel executives, which indicates that these
individuals' abilities are quite high in the
organization and are considered trustworthy due to their decisive roles in the
organization. In addition to committing
frauds, capable managers show that
managers are willing to manipulate or
exploit others to achieve their goals
(Akinwumi et al. 2020). Without the ability
to commit frauds, the opportunities and
pressures that arise to commit frauds will
not run optimally. Managers who have a
good understanding of finance will be
easier to manipulate (Smith et al. 2021).
Additionally, they also have the
understanding and access to know which
items in the financial statements can be
manipulated. Even if the manager has the
capability or ability to commit fraudulent
financial reporting, the AC can limit their
power. The AC must be critical and master
the scope of knowledge and experience.
The AC will be able to detect financial
statement manipulation cases better if they
are also financially competent (Gorshunov
et al. 2021). The AC has a more thorough
understanding of financial statements and
can independently examine the adequacy of
financial statements. Financial literacy
allows them to find problems in financial
statements and skillfully deal with
managers (Hambrick et al. 2015).
H4a: Managers are likely to be involved
in FFS when they have a high
capability to commit fraud.
H4b: The AC moderates the relationship
between the manager's capability to
the probability of FFS.
One of the main characteristics of
narcissistic managers is that they hold on to
unrealistic and unattainable goals because
of their excessive self-aggrandizement
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(García-Meca et al. 2021). Managers with
big ego consider themselves capable of
achieving high targets to get the image that
they are the best managers. The main goal
of managers wanting to achieve high
targets, or even unrealistic ones, is to gain
the recognition as great managers and
receive more incentives (Cragun et al.
2020). To fulfill their ambition, managers
might do various things, which is only to
achieve their unrealistic goals. They might
feel the need to show good performance in
managing the company because of the
desire to hold this position for a long time.
Managers with big egos will use their
authority to force others in the subordinate
positions to follow their will in achieving
such unrealistic targets. Their unrealistic
targets can be manifested in the financial
reports. Managers with high egos will force
them to manipulate financial statements so
that the information conveyed follows what
they are targeting. Selfish managers will
create specific information processing
barriers to the AC and regain control. The
AC is required to suppress the manager's
ego and strengthen their position as a
supervisor so that managers do not take
advantage of their power and position.
Managers do not cover up information
critical to the company (Boivie et al. 2021),
so with the presence of AC, the manager's
ego will also be suppressed, making it less
likely for them to commit fraudulent
financial reporting.
H5a: Managers are likely to be involved
in FFS when they have a high ego to
commit fraud.
H5b: The AC moderates the relationship
between the manager's ego to the
probability of FFS.

requires parties to act as "partners in crime"
(Maas and Yin 2021). The manager is a
figure within the company who has the
advantage of network and connectivity with
other parties who can be invited to form
illegal cooperation. Managers can easily
hide or insert frauds that they do by
cooperating with other parties, making it
difficult for the supervisors to detect. The
preparation of financial statements is
related to transactions with parties outside
the company—when the parties who
transact with the company collude, the
transactions that occur appear authentic.
The AC's challenge is to ensure accurate
information and keep it from being
influenced by managers collaborating to
commit fraud (Pathak et al. 2021). The AC
is responsible for monitoring and managing
violations that are caused within the
organization and aim to reduce complex
fraud risks (Alam et al. 2021). An AC that
plays an optimal role can find the activities
of managers who commit collusion and
which parties carry out the fraudulent
financial reporting. Therefore, AC must
ensure accuracy in corporate financial
reporting (Fiolleau et al. 2019), although it
is challenging to trace collusive FFS. The
AC also maximizes the supervision of
financial statements. The manager conveys
all transactions carried out with related
parties and ensures that the transactions
carried out are normal.
H6a: Managers have a high probability of
being involved in FFS when they
have high collusion to commit
fraud.
H6b: The AC moderates the relationship
between the manager's collusion to
the probability of FFS.

When many parties work together to
commit fraud, the damage caused can be
much more devastating (Zahari et al. 2021).
This is because collusion can cause parties
who do not want to commit fraud to be
incited to participate because of the
pressure from the fraud perpetrators if they
are not willing to cooperate. Collusion also

RESEARCH METHOD
The population in this study are all
non-financial companies listed in the
Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX). The
research period is between 2016 and 2020.
This research covers all industrial sectors
because it anticipates the FFS detection
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model, which is not entirely able to detect it
100%. The sample selection method used
was purposive sampling, which obtained
325 companies as the research samples.
The data needed in this study were taken
from the IDX’s website and the Eikon
Thomson Reuters’s database. The analysis
used is logistic regression, in which there
are two research models as shown below:
FFSi,t = α + β1STIi,t + β2OPPi,t +β3RAZi,t +
β4CAPi,t +β5EGOi,t +β6COLi,t +
β7control + ε ………….. (Model 1)
FFSi,t = α + β1STIi,t + β2OPPi,t +β3RAZi,t +
β4CAPi,t +β5EGOi,t + β6COLi,t +
β7ACi,t*STIi,t + β8ACi,t*OPPi,t +
β9ACi,t*RAZi,t +β10ACi,t*CAPi,t
+β11ACi,t*EGOi,t + β12ACi,t*COLi,t
+ β13control + ε …………..
(Model 2)
Where:
FFS
STI
OPP
RAZ
CAP
EGO
COL
AC
α
β
ε

: fraudulent financial statements
: stimulus
: opportunity
: rationalization
: capability
: egoism
: collusion
: audit committee
: constant
: coefficient regression
: error

FFS detection is measured using the
M-score, which is composed of eight ratios
that capture either financial statement
distortions that can result from earnings
manipulation or indicate a predisposition to
engage in earnings manipulation (Beneish
et al. 2013). M-score is estimated that any
company with an M-score of > -2.22 tends
to be a manipulator, whereas companies
with an M-score of < -2.22 do not
manipulate. The results of the M-score
calculation will produce two categories that
are used as dummy variables. Companies
that are indicated to perform FFS with an
M-score of > -2.22 will be assigned a code
of 1, which means the company tends to
commit fraudulent financial reporting.
Meanwhile, if the M-score is < -2.22, it will

be given a code of 0, meaning that the
company is not indicated to commit
fraudulent financial reporting. The eight
ratios form an M-score equation following
Aviantara et al. (2021) and Kukreja et al.
(2020):
M-score = -4.84 + 0.92*DSR + 0.528*GMI +
0.404*AQI
+
0.892*SGI
+
0.115*DEPI – 0.172*SGAI +
4.679*Accrual – 0.327*LEVI

DSR is the ratio of sales in the form
of receivables in year t divided by year t-1.
GMI is the gross margin ratio divided by
year t-1. AQI is the ratio of the company's
fixed and current assets, which is then
divided by total assets and compared with
year t-1. SGI is the ratio of sales in year t
divided by year t-1. DEPI is the fixed asset
depreciation rate ratio in year t divided by
year t-1. SGAI is the ratio of general and
administrative selling expenses divided by
sales in year t, then compared to year t-1.
Accruals are obtained from net income
minus operating cash flows, and then
divided by total assets in year t. LEVI is
obtained from the leverage ratio in year t
divided by year t-1. As for the sensitivity
analysis using OMI, it is obtained from the
benchmark scoring in each ratio component
in the M-score equation, following Hasan et
al. (2017). On the other hand, the
operationalization of other variables is
shown in Table 1.
The AC measurement uses analysis
content following Utama et al. (2017) based
on ACGS items in the company's annual
report. For the assessed companies, each
item is checked based on whether the
company practices the item in their annual
report. Components related to the audit
committee are in the board structure and
composition section. If the company's
annual report contains appropriate
information on the measurement item, it is
given a score of 1, and if it is not
appropriate, it is given a score of 0.
Thenceforth, it is calculated using the
formula, where n means the number of
elements of the implemented ACGS, and k
means the total analyzed ACGS elements,
which are nine items.
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Table 1
Variable Measurement
Variable
Fraud Hexagon
Stimulus
(STI)

Opportunity (OPP)
Rationalization
(RAZ)

Capabilities (CAP)
Ego (EGO)

Collusion
(COL)

Description

Source

(𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 − 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑)(𝑡)
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑡 − 1

Skousen et al.
(2009)

𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 (𝑡) 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 (𝑡 − 1)
−
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 (𝑡)
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 (𝑡 − 1)
Code 1 if the change of auditors is carried out
before the maximum period of tenure ends.
Code 0 if the change of auditors is made due to
the maximum term of tenure/mandatory
rotation; or Code 0 if the auditors do not change.
Code 1 if the CEO has a financial background.
Code 0 if the CEO has no financial background.
Natural log of total remuneration paid to the
managers

Skousen et al.
(2009)
Skousen et al.
(2009)

𝑅𝑃𝑇 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 + 𝑅𝑃𝑇 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦

Moderation Variable
Audit
Committee Content analysis that scores from the provisions
(AC)
contained in the ASEAN Corporate Governance
Scorecard (ACGS)
Control Variables
Firm Size (SIZE)
Profitability (ROA)
Managerial
share
(MNG)
Change in leverage
(ΔLEV)

Natural of total asset in year t
ROA =

𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒
𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑡−1
−
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑡 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑡−1

𝑛
∗ 100%
𝑘
Total ACGS Criteria for the AC
section are nine items from each item
checked according to the annual report with
the criteria provided by ACGS. If AC
applies all ACGS provisions, the value
obtained is 100%, while, for example AC is
only 4 of 9 ACGS provisions, then AC has
a value of 4 divided by nine then multiplied
by 100%, which is 44.44%. The value of
AC content analysis may not be 0 because
several provisions in the ACGS are
mandatory in Indonesia; for example, one
of the AC members must have an
accounting background; or meet at least
four times a year.
𝐴𝐶 =

𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡

Boyle et al.
(2015)
Chatterje and
Hambrick
(2011)
Habib et al.
(2017)

Utama et al.
(Utama et al.
2017a)

Fakhroni et
al. (2018)
Fakhroni et
al. (2018)
Skousen et al.
(2009)
Aviantara et
al. (2021)

RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
To observe the data in this study, a
data quality test was conducted to ensure
the accuracy of the findings obtained. The
multicollinearity problem was tested based
on the correlation between the explanatory
variables and the variance inflation factor
(VIF). Symptoms of multicollinearity can
be seen from the VIF value and the
correlation matrix that none is close to the
0.8 points. In addition, the VIF value of
each variable is far below the specified
threshold, which is 10.
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Table 2
Regression Results
Variable
Constant
STI
OPP
RAZ
CAP
EGO
COL
STI*AC
OPP*AC
RAZ*AC
CAP*AC
EGO*AC
COL*AC
ROA
MNG
SIZE
ΔLEV

Prediction

Model 1
Coefficient

Sig

Prediction

Model 2
Coefficient

Sig

+
+
+
+
+
+

.6176518
.0000631
2.976903
199301.5
4.361529
-1.019925
-.0070391

0.000***
0.000***
0.443
0.000***
0.025**
0.403

+
+
+
+

1692.202
1.353934
1.01776
.5629546

0.000***
0.678
0.000***
0.000***

+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+

-.2518379
2.1222222
2.3000000
153.8539
3587.124
3.9222222
6839617
-.6840109
-.7661125
-.9508917
-.9031881
-.5616934
-.7913319
3024.841
2.339776
.6217852
.8233509

0.004*
0.028**
0.084*
0.000***
0.075*
0.160
0.006***
0.000***
0.068*
0.000***
0.178
0.120
0.000***
0.638
0.003***
0.000***

Significant: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05
The sample consists of 1625 years of observation, with all industrial sectors except the financial industry. MScore: FFS uses the Beneish Mscore; STI: stimulus; OPP: opportunity; RAZ: rationalization; CAP: capability; EGO: ego/arrogance; COL: collusion; AC: audit committee;
MNG: managerial ownership; ROA: return on assets; SIZE: company size; ΔLEV: change in leverage year t to t-1

Discussion
The findings in Table 2 in model 1
show that the tendency of managers to be
indicated to commit fraudulent financial
reporting is higher when they have a
stimulus to commit a fraud, meaning that
H1a is accepted. This finding follows the
concept developed by Vousinas (2019) and
the argument of Dorminey et al. (2012) that
there is an expansion of the meaning of
pressure that causes someone to make FFS,
where fraudulent financial reporting occurs
because the managers who initially do not
think about committing a fraud later see
that there are favorable conditions, hence
they are motivated to commit a fraud.
However, managers commit fraud because
they see an advantage that can be taken
incidentally. When a manager takes an
action, or in this case is making FFS, it is
caused by something that the directors saw,
heard, smelled, and so on just a moment
before (Villaescusa and Amat 2021).
Preparing financial statements is basically
based on the applicable accounting
standards, which the managers are required

to obey in preparing financial statements.
However, when the manager sees a gap to
circumvent the relevant standards, the
manager can potentially be involved in
fraudulent financial reporting. This finding
supports the SAT, which states that the
outcome of the perception choice process is
a situational mechanism (Wikström 2010).
It means asserts that acts of fraud can
happen due to a combination of individual
and environmental factors, where the
stimulus due to the environment owned by
the managers provokes or encourages him
to commit fraud incidentally.
On the other hand, the findings in
model 2 show the probability of managers
having a stimulus to perform FFS is
reduced when the AC is closely watching,
which means that H1b is accepted. Stimulus
relates to the relationship between the
impulses of a situation experienced by the
manager and how they respond. Initially,
the manager did not intend to commit fraud,
but when there is a situation that
encourages it, the manager has the potential
to commit fraud. AC has proven that
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continuous monitoring of managers will be
able to reduce the stimulus and motivation
that appears incidentally to manipulate
financial reports. Managers do not
experience situations that can encourage
them to make FFS due to the strict supervision from the AC since the preparation of
the financial statements (Abri et al. 2019).
The AC’s duties are stated in the AC
Charter owned by each company. The AC
assists the managers by reviewing the
company's financial information and
reviewing the company's compliance with
the prevailing laws and regulations related
to the company's operational activities. AC
not only monitors the output of financial
statements when they are finished but also
accompanies managers in preparing
financial reports so that managers do not
experience situations that can encourage
them to do FFS.
The findings of this study in Model 1
show that the tendency of managers to
commit fraudulent financial reporting will
increase when they have high opportunities
to commit fraud, meaning that H2a is
accepted. This argument is based on the
research model used because, in Model 1,
there are no variables that are part of the
elements of CG. When there is no
supervision or good governance, managers
have an excellent opportunity to commit
fraud, allowing them to manipulate the
financial statements. This finding also
supports the argument of Dorminey et al.
(2012), which states that among the three
initial elements that make up the fraud
triangle, namely pressure, opportunity, and
rationalization, opportunity is the main
element that explains why someone
commits a fraud.
Opportunities for
estimates and judgments allowed by
accounting standards can result in unethical
decisions, such as accounting manipulation
(Kagias et al. 2021). Because of this
advantage, managers will be more likely to
manipulate financial statements where they
believe they will have the chance to do so
(Nguyen et al. 2021). Even if the situational
odds are low, some people may still take
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their chances (Desai 2020). The intention to
manipulate the financial statements and
rationalization of the fraud perpetrators will
not work if the perpetrators do not have the
opportunity to carry out their fraudulent
actions. This finding is in line with the
SAT, which emphasizes that the
perception-choice process offers a
mechanism by which moral emotions can
influence decision-making to commit fraud
(Trivedi-Bateman 2021). Managers who
take advantage of the opportunity to
commit the slightest fraud are part of an
immoral act that affects their decisionmaking process, which ends in manipulating financial statements. This finding
confirms that the morals held by the
managers determine whether they will
commit fraud or not. This is because
different people will differ in interpreting
the opportunities that exist, both small and
large, to commit fraud (Nguyen et al. 2021).
On the other hand, the optimal role of
the AC reduces the tendency of managers
to take advantage of opportunities, meaning
that H2b is accepted. The AC is usually
charged with ensuring that the company's
financial statements meet the criteria for
accuracy (Gorshunov et al. 2021).
Managers respond to the opportunities to
commit fraud differently in each situation.
Suppose in preparing financial statements,
and managers feel that the company's
control is weak. In that case, the
opportunity will increase the possibility of
managers committing fraudulent financial
reporting. For example, the AC has to
ensure that managers do not have a conflict
of interest in the company. Suppose the AC
cannot detect a manager's conflict of
interest in preparing financial statements. In
that case, the managers can take advantage
of the opportunity to manipulate the
condition of the company's financial
statements to be in accordance with their
own interests. However, on the contrary, if
the managers feel that the AC closely
monitors the preparation of financial
statements, they do not dare to use their
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opportunities to commit fraudulent
financial reporting.
There is no tendency for the
managers to make FFS, be it with high or
low rationalization, meaning that H3a is
rejected. An individual who feels depressed
will take advantage of the existing
opportunities, and in the end, he does not
rationalize the action (Kagias et al. 2021).
This shows that when the manager commits
fraud, he will understand the risks.
Managers who get caught manipulating
accounting and committing a fraud will
bear the consequences (Nguyen et al.
2021). This finding is not in line with the
SAT, where relevant morals are used as the
basis for explaining the decision to commit
a fraud. On the other hand, moral actions
are defined as actions that are governed by
what is right or wrong to do in certain
circumstances (Trivedi-Bateman 2021).
Additionally, the optimal role of the AC
does not affect the tendency of managers to
take advantage of opportunities to make
FFS, meaning that H3b is rejected. The
underlying thing is that the manager does
not think that the fraud committed is the
right thing or needs to be justified, so that
in committing fraudulent financial reporting, the manager does not think about
the reasons for justification.
The probability that the managers
take advantage of manipulating financial
statements will increase when managers
have high capabilities of committing a
fraud. The occurrence of FFS will increase
when the manager has a high capability to
commit fraud, meaning that H4a is
accepted. Without the ability of managers
to execute a fraud, managers will not
commit it even though they have the
stimulus, opportunity, and rationalization to
do so (Maulidi and Ansell 2020). This
finding supports the argument of Wolfe and
Hermanson (2004), who argue that
capability triggers fraud. Managers can
manipulate financial statements when they
are equipped with knowledge and
knowledge about finance so that they know
the gaps to do FFS and execute the

opportunities that they have to be perfect
and difficult to detect. Managers with high
capabilities tend to commit more frauds
than those with lower positions (Utami et
al. 2019). Managers who have high
capabilities are able to commit fraud
because they know the ins and outs of the
company. This finding is in line with the
SAT because managers consider the
surrounding conditions, such as the
opportunities that exist, to commit fraud
and then cause the managers to take a
situational decision at that time to commit
fraud. This finding follows the argument of
Dorminey et al. (2012), which explains that
capability modifies the construct of
opportunity by limiting opportunities in the
sense that individuals must have the
appropriate skills to use opportunities. That
is, when there is an opportunity to do FFS,
managers must have more knowledge about
financial statements, which will then be
able to move FFS more neatly and
realistically.
On the other hand, the optimal role of
the AC will reduce the tendency of
managers to take advantage of their
capabilities to commit fraudulent financial
reporting, which means that H4b is
accepted. Effective monitoring can be
achieved only if an AC has the capability
and performance above the threshold level.
This means that the AC requires the
necessary competence to fulfill their
supervisory duties effectively (Hambrick et
al. 2015). Behind its role in filling the role
as part of CG, AC is required to have
qualified competence to be able to carry out
its duties optimally. Financial literacy
allows the AC to find problems in financial
statements and skillfully deal with
managers (Gorshunov et al. 2021). AC is
more likely to recognize and understand
issues that may arise if they have relevant
knowledge in a particular problem area
(Velte 2021). This is not without reason
because managers know the company, its
operations, and internal management issues
inside and out, and they can use this
knowledge to pursue their interests
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(Seifzadeh et al. 2021). As a result,
although managers can understand loopholes in manipulating financial statements,
the AC is more skilled at dealing with
managers to minimize the potential for
managers to commit fraudulent financial
reporting.
The tendency of managers to make
FFS will increase even if the manager has a
low ego to commit fraud, meaning that H5a
is rejected. This finding is inversely
proportional to the direction of the
coefficient than the research hypothesis.
Highly narcissistic managers do not like it
when they have poor performance and a
negative self-image (Chatterjee and
Hambrick 2011). Cragun et al. (2020)
added that managers with high ego is
related to company performance. In other
words, managers with high ego need
recognition from others that they are
successful leaders who can carry out their
duties well. They try their best to maintain
their integrity in running the company to
achieve the company's performance targets.
To maintain their self-image, the managers
try to carry out their duties honestly and
transparently so that they will get recognition, appreciation, and a more sustainable
position than having to commit fraudulent
financial reporting to achieve unreasonable
targets. This finding is not in line with the
SAT, where managers' ego demands that
they decide what action to take, but their
ego leads to the choice not to commit fraud.
On the other hand, the optimal role of the
AC cannot affect the tendency of managers
who have high ego to make FFS, meaning
that H5b is rejected. No matter how big the
manager's ego is, the AC cannot eliminate
the possibility of the manager being
provoked into committing fraudulent
financial reporting because of their ego.
However, suppose it is related to the
findings in Model 1. In that case, this is
relevant because, without supervision from
the AC, managers assume that when they
have a high ego, they will tend to not
commit fraudulent financial reporting.
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Managers do not make FFS, be it
when they have a large or small collusion
network, meaning that H6a is rejected.
Managers do not find the right 'partner in
crime' to collude with (Maas and Yin 2021),
or looking for partners to collude with is too
risky if their partners cannot be invited to
cooperate. This finding indicates that
collusion may not be caught through the
information submitted by managers in the
financial statements because they might
work together to delete certain information
in the financial statements. When several
managers work together, they may undermine independent transaction verification
processes or other mechanisms designed to
uncover fraud (Vousinas 2019). The SAT
changes attention from the level of analysis
of a person (individual) committing fraud to
a more complex level. However, this
finding shows that when fraud is driven
collectively or managers collude, it does
not cause an indication of FFS. On the other
hand, the optimal role of the AC cannot
influence the tendency of managers who
have a large collusive network to perform
FFS, meaning that H6b is rejected. It will be
tough, if not impossible, to detect it
(Villaescusa and Amat 2021). The AC has
difficulty detecting the occurrence of FFS
if, in the preparation of financial statements, the manager cooperates with many
parties so that they can manipulate transactions and their traces. The AC is more likely
to identify errors if they elaborate on the
information provided in detail (Pathak et al.
2021). Apparently, when the managers
colluded, they would not provide all the
information needed by the AC (Xiao et al.
2021), which made it difficult for the AC to
detect the fraud.
Sensitivity Analysis
The test is carried out using the
coefficient difference test in the sensitivity
analysis. The component used as the basis
for the difference tests is the Overall
Manipulation Index (OMI) variable, which
has 8 data groupings due to its stratified
scoring. However, the difference test can
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only be done at the OMI value = 1 to OMI
= 6 because OMI = 0, OMI = 7, and OMI =
8 have little observational data that make
the regression cannot be carried out.
This analysis presented in Table A (in
Appendix) shows that the findings obtained
in the primary study model are consistent
with the sensitivity test. The stimulus and
the opportunity has a significant effect on
the indication of FFS occurrence when the
variables are OMI 4 to OMI 6, with the
coefficient value increasing in each OMI.
That is, the tendency of managers to
perform fraudulent financial reporting
caused by them having a stimulus and
opportunities to commit fraud is when they
manipulate four to six components in the
financial statements.
The manager's ability has a
significant effect on the indication of FFS
occurrence when the variables are OMI 2 to
OMI 6, with the coefficient value increasing in each OMI. That is, the tendency of
managers to perform fraudulent financial
reporting caused by them having the
capability to commit fraud is when they
manipulate two to six components in the
financial statements. This shows that
managers can maximize the components of
the financial statements even though only a
few are manipulated with the knowledge
they have. This finding is linear with the
main finding of this study. With the
slightest opportunity to make FFS,
managers who have high knowledge will
show their capability to see the tiniest gaps
to do it.
Other findings show that regardless
of the number of components in the
financial statements manipulated by
managers, they are not based on rationalizations for their actions. The manager's
ego plays a central role in which, when
more and more elements in the financial
statements are manipulated, the manager's
ego is getting smaller. This is in line with
the findings of this study which suggest that
the manager's ego is related to the ego to
maintain their integrity, so that they attempt

to minimize the manipulation to keep their
integrity undamaged.
CONCLUSION
Model 1 testing shows that behavioral
factors that influence managers to commit
fraudulent financial reporting are when
managers have high stimuli, ample
opportunities, and high capabilities to
manipulate financial statements. On the
other hand, this study obtained inversely
proportional findings to the hypothesis.
This study found that managers with high
egos do not tend to make FFS. Another
finding in Model 1 shows that the
manager's rationalization and network of
collusion do not increase their tendency to
commit fraudulent financial reporting. In
Model 2 testing, it shows that the AC can
minimize the behavior of motivated
managers, see opportunities, and execute
these opportunities into FFS. Model 2 also
finds that the AC cannot minimize the
manager's rationalization, ego, and
collusion network, which causes managers
to tend to make FFS. The sensitivity test
also corroborates the findings in the
primary model of this study.
The current study is not free from
limitations that can be corrected in future
studies. This study only generalizes all
industrial sectors without grouping each
industry so that the findings are less
specific. Besides, it also does not consider
the impact factors of the COVID-19
pandemic. Therefore, further research can
consider the impact of the COVID -19
pandemic as one of the variables that
determine the companies to carry out
fraudulent financial reporting because not
all pandemics have the same impact due to
COVID-19. Measurement of manager
behavior in the fraud hexagon model,
which is interpreted using the components
contained in the financial statements, can
be more optimal if data mining is
strengthened using primary data in the
forms of surveys and questionnaires.
Measurement of variables that show the
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findings do not affect the occurrence of
FFS, namely rationalization, ego, collusion,
may indicate that the variables are less
relevant and less representative because the
proxy is based on the monetary value stated
in the financial statements. Therefore,
further research can formulate more
relevant measurements in interpreting the
elements that exist in the fraud hexagon
with its relationship to the behavior when it
is carried out for manipulation of financial
statements.
This study discusses and directly
relates the variables in the fraud hexagon
model without mentioning or discussing the
relationship with its proxies in discussing
the findings, limiting the researchers in
discussing the effect of these variables on
the occurrence of FFS indications. Future
research is expected to build arguments in
explaining the elements in the fraud
hexagon model and other fraud models not
referring to the proxies used. However,
arguments are built on the behavior that
causes FFS so that the findings obtained
can later be narrowed down to find out
which behaviors have the potential to cause
managers to commit fraudulent financial
reporting because this is still rarely done by
previous empirical studies. This study
performs a coefficient difference test by
grouping companies that make FFS based
on the number of components of financial
statements manipulated using OMI. Further
research can be developed because this is
still rarely done. Further research can also
rank which industrial sectors have
indications of FFS occurrence with high
and low potential, as well as which
elements of the financial statements are
most often used to commit fraudulent
financial reporting.
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Appendix
Table A
Sensitivity Analysis
STI

OPP

RAZ

CAP

EGO

COL

coef

sig

coef

sig

coef

sig

coef

sig

coef

sig

coef

sig

OMI 1

1.23

0.25

0.23

0.80

14.83

0.98

1.22

0.24

-1.71

0.00***

0.13

0.89

OMI 2

2.01

0.05*

1.10

0.20

16.06

0.98

2.28

0.02**

-2.39

0.00***

0.86

0.37

OMI 3

2.00

0.05*

1.23

0.15

16.12

0.98

2.33

0.02**

-2.62

0.01***

1.19

0.21

OMI 4

2.51

0.02**

1.84

0.03**

16.78

0.98

3.18

0.00***

-3.33

0.03**

1.99

0.04**

OMI 5

3.46

0.00***

3.41

0.00***

17.72

0.98

3.98

0.00***

-4.00

0.04**

2.15

0.03**

OMI 6

4.48

0.00***

3.51

0.00***

18.57

0.98

5.10

0.00***

4.42

0.16

4.00

0.00***

Rsquare

0.1046

0.1384

0.1487

0.1384

0.0956

0.0976

Significant: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05
OMI: Overall Manipulation Index; STI: stimulus; OPP: opportunity; RAZ: rationalization; CAP: capability; EGO: ego/arrogance; COL:
collusion

